The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated inequalities, including among the healthcare workforce. Based on recent literature and drawing on our experiences of working in operating theatres and critical care in the UK’s National Health Service during the pandemic, we review the role of personal protective equipment and consider the ethical implications of its design, availability and provision at a time of unprecedented demand. Several important inequalities have emerged, driven by factors such as individuals purchasing their own personal protective equipment, inconsistencies between (...) guidelines issued by different agencies and organisations, and the standardised design and procurement of equipment required to protect a diverse healthcare workforce. These, we suggest, have resulted largely because of a lack of appropriate pandemic planning and coordination, as well as insufficient appreciation of the significance of equipment design for the healthcare setting. As with many aspects of the pandemic, personal protective equipment has created and revealed inequalities driven by economics, gender, ethnicity and professional influence, creating a division between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ of personal protective equipment. As the healthcare workforce continues to cope with ongoing waves of COVID-19, and with the prospect of more pandemics in the future, it is vital that these inequalities are urgently addressed, both through academic analysis and practical action. All data relevant to the study are included in the article. (shrink)

Motorcycle helmet laws are perceived to infringe upon individual rights even though they reduce mortality and health care costs. We describe proposed helmet legislation that protects individual rights and provides incentives for helmet use through a differential motorcycle registration fee that requires higher fees for those who wish to ride without a helmet.

This book offers both the theoretical background behind the minority effect, teachers' personal experiences as they experienced being a minority, and their analyses and insights for teaching diverse learners. This book uses real-life experiences of diverse people to illustrate that, if not understood and addressed, situational minorities at school or work are unlikely to perform at their highest potentials.

I argue that the proper way to think of the difference between A- and B-time is not as the difference between transition and the lack of transition, as is common, but as A-transition and B-transition. However, it is not evident what the difference is between these two kinds of transition. Thus, it is not evident what the difference is between A- and B-time.

I argue that our experience of time supports the B-Theory of time and not the A-Theory of time. We do not experience pastness, presentness, and futurity as mind-independent properties of events. My method in supporting this experiential claim is to show that our experience of presentness is like our experience of hereness--in neither case are we aware of a mind-independent property over and above the events or objects to which we ascribe the presentness or hereness.

The common assumption in the debate between the A- and B-theories is that there is a difference between A- and B-time. A-time has been said to be characterized by a flow, whereas B-time has been said not to consist of a flow. This way of construing the debate, however, is mistaken. Both A- and B-time possess "flow" or transition. But if this is so, we need to ask how B-time flow differs from A-time flow. I argue that none of the (...) ways in which the difference has been characterized is satisfactory. My conclusion is that the debate between A- and B-time either needs to be recast or given up. (shrink)

The traditional description of A- and B-time is that the former consists of a mind-independent past, present, and future, and that the latter consists solely of the time relations--earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than. Although this description makes it look as if there are two clearly contrasting concepts of time, it does not differentiate the passage of A-time from the succession in B-time. Nor does it explain what it means for events in B-time to be equally real and for (...) events in A-time not to be equally real. I argue that although McTaggart and numerous others have thought that there is a difference between the two kinds of time, it remains undescribed. (shrink)

Debate between the A- and B-theories has rested on the supposition that there is a clear difference between A- and B-time. I argue that this supposition is mistaken for two reasons. We cannot distinguish the two conceptions of time by means of Bergsonian intuition. Unless we can do so, we cannot distinguish them at all. I defend by imagining various ways to intuit the two kinds of time, and maintaining that none of them works. I defend by showing that the (...) issue is an experiential one, unlike metaphysical issues that are less connected to experience. My conclusion is that no progress will be made in the debate between the two theories until it becomes clear what the difference is between the two kinds of time. (shrink)

In this paper we show how the dynamics of the Schrödinger, Pauli and Dirac particles can be described in a hierarchy of Clifford algebras, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}${\mathcal{C}}_{1,3}, {\mathcal{C}}_{3,0}$\end{document}, and \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}${\mathcal{C}}_{0,1}$\end{document}. Information normally carried by the wave function is encoded in elements of a minimal left ideal, so that all the physical information appears within the algebra itself. The state of the quantum process can (...) be completely characterised by algebraic invariants of the first and second kind. The latter enables us to show that the Bohm energy and momentum emerge from the energy-momentum tensor of standard quantum field theory. Our approach provides a new mathematical setting for quantum mechanics that enables us to obtain a complete relativistic version of the Bohm model for the Dirac particle, deriving expressions for the Bohm energy-momentum, the quantum potential and the relativistic time evolution of its spin for the first time. (shrink)

This article introduces and clarifies a neglected sense of the word ἤ (‘or’) employed by Aristotle and other authors. In this sense, called ‘indifferent’, ἤ signifies ‘one or the other, regardless of which’. It is shown how attention to this use makes it possible to explain the source of the ambiguity of certain sentences, most obviously, though not exclusively, sentences that make a necessity claim about an embedded disjunction, for example ‘It is necessary that A or B’. Why this sense (...) cannot be explained, as some scholars have suggested, by the distinction between exclusive and inclusive ἤ is also discussed. Finally, it is shown how awareness of this sense might rescue Aristotle from a gross inconsistency. (shrink)

Several influential psychologists have attempted to estimate to what extent human happiness levels are directly controlled by genes by comparing the happiness levels of identical twins raised apart. If we discover that the happiness levels of identical twins raised apart tend to be closer than the happiness levels of fraternal twins raised apart, this is taken as evidence that average happiness levels are largely controlled by genes. However, if it turns out that identical twins' happiness levels tend to be substantially (...) different, as different as fraternal twins raised apart, it has been argued that this implies that the environment largely determines happiness levels. I contend that this interpretation of the data rests on a set of questionable, closely related assumptions: a) that pairs of identical twins raised apart are raised in substantially different environments; b) that genetically identical twins aren't identical in other pertinent ways; and c) that average levels of affect that are correlated with certain sets of genes in the environments the twin studies were conducted in will be correlated with those genes in other relevant environments because those genes govern average affect levels. In this paper, I will show that these assumptions are false and explain how to properly go about investigating the contingent causal links between genes and happiness. In the end, I argue that there is no good evidence that our genes delimit our hedonic potential and that the fact that this misinterpretation of the data has been widely disseminated is potentially harmful to human well-being. (shrink)

In a recent article entitled “Tensed Sentences and Free Repeatability” (The Philosophical Review,” 1973), Stephen E. Braude puts forward the following argument: (a) Nonsimultaneous replicas of tensed sentences have the same sense; (b) therefore, tensed sentences are not translatable into tenseless sentences. I point out that the plausibility of (a) depends on which theory of meaning is true. If the rules of use theory of meaning is true, then (a) is true, but if either the content or reference theory of (...) meaning is true, (a) is questionable. I also point out that some philosophers, such as Nelson Goodman and W. V. O. Quine, who deny (b) in order to make philosophical claims about the status of temporal becoming and perspicuous languages, do not state whether the equivalence of tensed and tenseless sentences is an equivalence of rules of use, content, or reference. Braude has shown that a rules of use version of (b) is true, but not that a content or reference version of (b) is true. (shrink)

Whitehead's 1922 theory of gravitation continues to attract the attention of philosophers, despite evidence presented in 1971 that it violates experiment. We demonstrate that the theory strongly fails five quite different experimental tests, and conclude that, notwithstanding its meritorious philosophical underpinnings, Whitehead's theory is truly dead.

We apply the Galilean covariant formulation of quantum dynamics to derive the phase-space representation of the Pauli–Schrödinger equation for the density matrix of spin-1/2 particles in the presence of an electromagnetic field. The Liouville operator for the particle with spin follows from using the Wigner–Moyal transformation and a suitable Clifford algebra constructed on the phase space of a (4 + 1)-dimensional space–time with Galilean geometry. Connections with the algebraic formalism of thermofield dynamics are also investigated.

In “Moral Imagination and the Search for Ethical Decision-Making,” Patricia H. Werhane observes that people and institutions sometimes do unethical things because they have a narrow perspective on their situation and little in the way of moral imagination. She defines moral imagination as “an ability to imaginatively discern various possibilities for acting in a given situation and to envision the potential help and harm that are likely to result from a given action.” Werhane’s paper focuses on how the conceptual schemes (...) of people and organizations hinder the exercise of moral imagination. She develops two key concepts for understanding moral imagination, memory or moral amnesia and empathy. Both of these give us a better picture of how imagination bridges the gap between moral principles and actions. (shrink)

The modern use of algebra to describe geometric ideas is discussed with particular reference to the constructions of Grassmann and Hamilton and the subsequent algebras due to Clifford. An Einstein addition law for nonparallel boosts is shown to follow naturally from the use of the representation-independent form of the geometric algebra of space-time.

This collection of essays, offered in honor of the distinguished career of prominent political philosophy professor Clifford Orwin, brings together internationally renowned scholars to provide a wide context and discuss various aspects of the virtue of “humanity” through the history of political philosophy.

In Interplay of Things Anthony B. Pinn theorizes religion as a technology for interrogating human experiences and the boundaries between people and other things. Rather than considering religion in terms of institutions, doctrines, and creeds, Pinn shows how religion exposes the openness and porousness of all things and how they are always involved in processes of exchange and interplay. Pinn examines work by Nella Larsen and Richard Wright that illustrates an openness between things and traces how pop art and readymades (...) point to the multidirectional nature of influence. He also shows how Ron Athey's and Clifford Owens' performance art draws out inherent interconnectedness to various cultural codes in ways that reveal the symbiotic relationship between art and religion as a technology. Theorizing that antiblack racism and gender- and class-based hostility constitute efforts to close off the porous nature of certain bodies, Pinn shows how many artists have rebelled against these attempts to counter openness. His analyses offer a means with which to understand the porous, unbounded, and open nature of humans and things. (shrink)

This collection of essays, offered in honor of the distinguished career of prominent political philosophy professor Clifford Orwin, brings together internationally renowned scholars to provide a wide context and discuss various aspects of the virtue of “humanity” through the history of political philosophy.

We present a general derivation of the Duffin-Kemmer-Petiau (D.K.P) equation on the relativistic phase space proposed by Bohm and Hiley. We consider geometric algebras and the idea of algebraic spinors due to Riesz and Cartan. The generators βμ (p) of the D.K.P algebras are constructed in the standard fashion used to construct Clifford algebras out of bilinear forms. Free D.K.P particles and D.K.P particles in a prescribed external electromagnetic field are analized and general Liouville type equations for these cases (...) are obtained. Choosing particular values for the label p we classify the different types of the D.K.P Liouville operators. (shrink)

It has been proposed that the implicate order can be given mathematical expression in terms of an algebra and that this algebra is similar to that used in quantum theory. In this paper we bring out in a simple way those aspects of the algebraic formulation of quantum theory that are most relevant to the implicate order. By using the properties of the standard ket introduced by Dirac we describe in detail how the Heisenberg algebra can be generalized to produce (...) an algebraic structure in which it is possible to describe space translations in a way that is analogous to the description of rotations in a Clifford algebra. This approach opens up the possibility of going beyond the limits of the present quantum formalism and we discuss briefly some of the new implications. (shrink)

We review some of the essential novel ideas introduced by Bohm through the implicate order and indicate how they can be given mathematical expression in terms of an algebra. We also show how some of the features that are needed in the implicate order were anticipated in the work of Grassmann, Hamilton, and Clifford. By developing these ideas further we are able to show how the spinor itself, when viewed as a geometric object within a geometric algebra, can be (...) given a meaning which transcends the notion of the usual metric geometry in the sense that it must be regarded as an element of a broader and more general pregeometry. (shrink)

This Article critically discusses Clifford Williams’ claim that the A-theory and B-theory of time are indistinguishable. I examine three considerations adduced by Williams to support his claim that the concept of time essentially includes transition as well as extension, and argue that, despite its prima facie plausibility, the claim has not been adequately justified. Williams therefore begs the question against the B-theorist, who denies that transition is essential. By Williams’ own lights, he ought to deny that the B-theory is (...) a (realist) theory of time; and thus his claim that A-time and B-time do not differ significantly should be rejected. (shrink)

This article is a response to Clifford Williams’s claim that the debate between A- and B theories of time is misconceived because these theories do not differ. I provide some missing support for Williams’s claim that the B-theory includes transition, by arguing that representative B-theoretic explanations for why we experience time as passing (even though it does not) are inherently unstable. I then argue that, contra Williams, it does not follow that there is nothing at stake in the A- (...) versus B debate. (shrink)

I summarize Silberstein, et. al’s (2006) discussion of the derivation of the Heisenberg commutators, whose work is based on Kaiser (1981, 1990) and Bohr, et. al. (1995, 2004a,b). I argue that Bohr and Kaiser’s treatment is not geometric enough, as it still relies on some unexplained residual notions concerning the unitary representation of transformations in a Hilbert space. This calls for a more consistent characterization of the role of i than standard QM can offer. I summarize David Hestenes’ (1985,1986) major (...) claims concerning the essential role Clifford algebras play in such a fundamental characterization of i, and I present a Clifford- algebraic derivation of the Heisenberg commutation relations (taken from Finkelstein, et. al. (2001)). I argue that their derivation exhibits a more fundamentally geometrical approach, which unifies geometric and ontological content. I also point out how some of Finkelstein’s ontological notions of “chronon dynamics” can give a plausible explanatory account of RBW’s “geometric relations.”. (shrink)